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I. INTRODUCTION
Washington, the Evergreen State, is known for its beautiful moun-
tains, trout-laden lakes, clear rivers, bountiful forests, and diverse wild-
life. In Washington, you are likely to see a bald eagle soaring over the
water in search of salmon, or perhaps a brown bear or a herd of deer
walking through the forest. Unfortunately, Washington's precious natu-
ral resources and ecosystem are in deep trouble.1
Each year, concern grows regarding the serious environmental,
economic, and health effects of America's energy policies. Due to our
insatiable demand for oil and our overdependence on nonrenewable fos-
sil fuels to generate energy,3 we are experiencing not only increasing gas
prices, but also detrimental health effects caused by the emission of
greenhouse gases 4 -"gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both
1 J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Spanish & Portuguese Studies, Uni-
versity of Washington, 2005. The author would like to thank his family, especially his mother, for
their love, patience, support, and encouragement. He would also like to thank Jason Keyes, Johanna
Ogdon, Laura Edwards, and the members of the Seattle University Law Review for their contribu-
tions to this Comment. Finally, the author would like to thank Professor Laurel Oates, Director of
Legal Writing at Seattle University School of Law, for her guidance, friendship, and mentorship.
1. Lisa Stiffler & Robert McClure, Our Warming World: Effects of Climate Change Bode Ill
for Northwest, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 13, 2003, at Al, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/148043_warming 13.html.
2. CATHERINE SUTER, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF CMTY., TRADE & ECON. DEV., RENEWABLE
ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY, AND SMART ENERGY INDUSTRIES IN WASHINGTON STATE (2005).
3. Paul Stanton Kibel & Ida Martinac, The Addiction and the Portfolio: An Introduction to the
Issue, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 321,321 (2006).
4. IRVING M. MINTZER ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPERATIVE 1 (1996). Policymakers
and scientists have acknowledged the linkage of fossil fuels, acid rain, and air pollution to human
health for several decades. Id. ("Recent medical research indicates that energy-related pollution
threatens human health even more than previously suspected.").
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natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation."5
The contribution of greenhouse gases to global warming presents an even
greater danger.6
Worldwide energy production relies overwhelmingly on the con-
sumption of fossil fuels. 7 As a result, grave environmental concerns sur-
round the production of electric energy, which releases an extraordinary
amount of greenhouse gases.8 A recent report indicated that "without
rapid and substantial spending to reduce greenhouse gases, climate
change will devastate food sources, cause widespread deaths, and turn
hundreds of millions of people into refugees." 9 These greenhouse gases
do not affect only the countries that release them; their impact is transna-
tional.10  Illustratively, recent studies indicate that fossil fuel-based
power plants have caused pollutants from Asia to reach the West Coast
and U.S. pollutants to drift to Europe. l1
It should come as no surprise, then, that the impact of global warm-
ing is felt at the state level as well. In Washington, for example, the De-
partment of Ecology predicts that climate change caused by global
warming could potentially mean warmer temperatures, wetter winters
(resulting in increased flooding), and recurring drought seasons. 12 Cli-
mate change is expected to cause a rise in sea level, coastal erosion and
landslides, the loss of wetlands and estuaries, and seawater intrusion into
wells. 13 Moreover, we will see less snow in the mountains1 4 and an in-
crease in human diseases. 15 Washingtonians can also expect a loss of
forestlands, caused by increased forest fires and insect infestations, as
5. James A. Holtkamp & Richard M. Saines, North American Approaches to Climate Change.
Greenhouse Gas Emission Control Strategies, 51 RMMLF-INST 2-1 (2005).
6. Id.
7. Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 261, 272 (2005).
8. Id.
9. William Neikirk, British Turn Up Heat on U.S. over Warming, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 31,
2006, at AI, available at 2006 WLNR 18992333.
10. Ferrey, supra note 7.
11. Id.
12. Washington State Department of Ecology, Extreme Weather,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/extremeweather.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
13. Washington State Department of Ecology, Rising Sea Level,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/risingsealevel.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
14. Washington State Department of Ecology, Reduced Snow Pack and Earlier Runoff,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/reducedsnow (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
15. Washington State Department of Ecology, Warmer Temperatures,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/warming more.htm#DISE (last visited Mar. 27, 2008); see
also NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, GLOBAL WARMING AND WASHINGTON (2008),
www.nwf.org/globalwarming/pdfs/Washington.pdf ("Scientists have found that warmer tempera-
tures caused by global warming can lead to higher concentrations of ground-level ozone pollution, a
leading cause of respiratory problems, especially in children and seniors. Already, the Seattle-
Tacoma area has had trouble meeting the national health standards for ozone.").
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well as an increased risk of extinction for salmon, caused by an increase
in ocean temperature and a decrease in nutrient levels. 16  In addition to
the degradation of Washington's ecosystem, harmful economic conse-
quences will likely occur.17  Regrettably, the federal government has
done little to deter such looming dangers.
The amount of federal support for energy efficiency has vacillated
over the years. Although efforts to promote energy conservation at the
federal level were spearheaded by President Carter, 18 culminating in the
passage of the National Energy Act of 1978,19 federal support for energy
efficiency diminished in the 1980s. 20  In the early 1990s, however, the
federal government briefly demonstrated a renewed interest in energy
efficiency by enacting the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Since then, fed-
eral support in this area has become grossly inadequate.2 1 Indeed, critics
characterize the Bush Administration's Energy Policy Act of 200522 as
nothing more than a "smorgasbord" of subsidies for U.S. energy compa-
nies. Despite this criticism, as well as pressure from international and
state governments to take global warming seriously, 24 the federal gov-
ernment continues to turn a blind eye to the problem of climate change.25
16. Warmer Temperatures, supra note 15.
17. NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, supra note 15 ("Loss of wildlife and habitat could mean a loss of
tourism dollars. In 2001, nearly 3 million people spent more than $2.3 billion on hunting, fishing,
and wildlife viewing in Washington, which in turn created 45,205 jobs in the state.").
18. ENERGY Div., WASH. STATE DEP'T OF CMTY., TRADE & ECON. DEV., THE NEXT
GENERATION OF ENERGY 8 (1998), available at
http://www.cted.wa.gov/energy/archive/ECONWReport/Default.htm.
19.42 U.S.C. § 13212 (1992).
20. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 754 (2006).
21. See Kibel & Martinac, supra note 3, at 322-24.
22. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1(a), 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7, 10, 15-16,
22-23, 25-26, 30, 33, 35, 40, 42-43, 48-49 U.S.C.).
23. See Michael Grunwald & Juliet Eilperin, Energy Bill Raises Fear About Pollution, WASH.
POST, July 30, 2005, at A], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/AR2005072901128.html.
24. Impact of Climate Change and Actions of the States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Kenneth A. Colbum, Executive Director, Northeast States Coordinated Air Use Management),
available at 2004 WL 1027324 ("In short, the states are responding to climate change by positioning
themselves defensively to protect their existing economies and reduce their vulnerability to climate
risks; offensively to get ahead on the learning curve and secure the economic advantages accruing to
early actors; and aggressively to protect public health, ecosystems, and overall quality of life.").
25. See Kibel & Martinac, supra note 3, at 322-24 (noting that "there presently appears to be a
disconnect between the public pronouncements of the current administration and the substantive
energy policies being pursued."). Not only has the Bush administration repudiated the Kyoto Proto-
col and promoted the enactment of the inadequate Energy Policy Act of 2005, but it has also "pres-
sured scientists conducting research for the federal government to downplay their climate change
findings." Id
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Confronted with federal complacency, many states have coura-
geously taken the initiative to combat global warming 26 by enacting local
legislation to curb carbon emissions.27 Some states have embraced re-
newable energy as a viable solution and are using tax incentives to pro-
mote it. For example, Washington implemented unique tax incentives in
2005 when it amended section 82.04.44028 and enacted section
82.16.12029 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). While the use
of state tax incentives to promote local economic growth is nothing
new,30 these statutes go further: they also promote renewable energy by
31providing tax incentives for its in-state use and production.
The Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however,
renders these laws constitutionally suspect, because it bars tax incentives
that discriminate against interstate commerce.32 Although the case law in
this area is befuddled,33 a general rule has emerged: "A tax which by its
terms or operation imposes greater burdens on out-of-state goods, activi-
ties, or enterprises than on competing in-state goods, activities, or enter-
prises will be struck down as discriminatory. 34
This Comment argues that Washington's renewable energy tax in-
centives likely discriminate against interstate commerce. More impor-
tantly, however, it contends that although these types of tax incentives
violate the Commerce Clause, Congress can and should pass legislation
authorizing their use under the state police power.
Part II of this Comment discusses the evolution of cooperative fed-
eralism in the environmental policy arena, as well as how many states
26. Hearing, supra note 24, at 3; see also Kirsten Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in
the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 54 (2005) ("Many state and
local governments in the United States are taking the lead in addressing global climate change, tack-
ling a problem that would be otherwise considered the province of the President working with Con-
gress in cooperation with the international community.").
27. Jennifer Lee, The Warming Is Global but the Legislating, in the U.S., Is All Local, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A20, available at 2003 WLNR 5664120.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.440(2), (4), (5)(c)(i) (2008) (granting comprehensive tax incen-
tives to the local solar electric industry).
29. § 82.16.120 (2008) (providing "investment cost recovery incentives" for the use of locally
made renewable energy products).
30. See Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Tax Incentives, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 413,415 (1997).
31. §§ 82.04.440, 82.16.120.
32. Hellerstein, supra note 30.
33. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Aban-
doning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 29, 29 (2002) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has itself acknowledged that its dormant
Commerce Clause case law is a 'quagmire."').
34. Hellerstein, supra note 30 (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1997); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 345-47 (1996); Associated
Indus. of Mo. v Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1994)).
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have responded to federal constraints on environmental protection. Part
III explores Washington's efforts to combat global warming and boost its
economy by using the renewable energy tax incentives, RCW sections
82.04.440 and 82.16.120. Part IV analyzes the Commerce Clause and the
Court's jurisprudence interpreting it. In particular, Part IV focuses on
the controversial DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno case 35 and the congres-
sional response it engendered. Part V goes on to explore whether Wash-
ington's tax incentives, and other similar state tax incentives, qualify as
discriminatory under the Commerce Clause. Part VI argues that al-
though the Court would likely hold that these types of state tax incentives
violate the Constitution, Congress can, and should, override such a deci-
sion through legislation, thereby allowing the states to protect human
health and the environment under their inherent police power. Finally,
Part VII summarizes the states' synthesis of tax and environmental pol-
icy to combat global warming, with a particular focus on Washington's
new statutes.
II. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION-ARE THE FEDS COOPERATING?
Cooperative federalism requires "that Congress treat the States in a
manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint par-
ticipants in the governance of the Nation., 36 In other words, although the
federal government is charged with promoting and protecting federal
interests, it should always do so in a way that does not unduly interfere
with legitimate state activities.37 In the environmental protection context,
the U.S. Supreme Court describes a cooperative federalism program as
one "that allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum
standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, struc-
tured to meet their own particular needs."
38
Notwithstanding the Court's understanding of this principle, the
federal government has not consistently adhered to the notion of dual
sovereignty, especially with regard to environmental regulation. The
following Sections describe the history and demise of federal environ-
mental protection, as well as the subsequent reemergence of the states as
environmental regulators.
35. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
36. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
37. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
38. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
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A. The History and Demise of Federal Environmental Regulation
The federal government derives its authority to protect human
health and the environment from its power to regulate interstate and for-
eign commerce, 39 as well as from the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which allows the government to effectuate any federal policy within its
enumerated powers.40 Unlike the federal government, the states derive
their authority to protect human health and the environment from their
inherent police power.4  Although the federal and state governments
each have ample authority to enact environmental protection legislation,
the states were the first to regulate polluting activities.4  Prior to the
1970s, state courts provided a forum for persons injured from pollution
to bring claims such as nuisance, trespass, and negligence in order to re-
ceive damages and injunctive relief.43 Additionally, local governments
implemented zoning regulations to separate incompatible land uses and
rudimentary pollution control regulations, such as smoke control ordi-
nances.
44
In 1970, however, the federal government emerged as the chief
regulator of pollution, primarily for three reasons. 45 First, Congress be-
lieved that a lack of federal regulation had resulted in a wide array of
incompatible and onerous state and local measures. 46 Second, it felt that
interstate pollution could be dealt with more effectively by the federal
government.47 Finally, Congress believed that its constituents considered
the environment "an important national good that transcends individual
or local interest. '48 Based on these justifications and on the premise that
state measures had proven inadequate, Congress set to work enacting
federal pollution control legislation.49
Although environmental regulation shifted from states to the federal
government, Congress assured the public that it did not intend to usurp
the states' traditional role as "guardians of the public health and
safety." 50 Rather, Congress envisioned shared governmental regulation
39. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
40. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
41. Glicksman, supra note 20, at 728.
42. Id. at 729.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 730.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 730-31.
48. Id. at 732-33 (citing Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a
Federal State, 1997 U. CHLi. LEGAL F. 199, 210 (1997)).
49. Id. at 731-32.
50. Id. at 738.
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in its pollution control statutes. 5' By the end of the 1970s, Congress had
adopted or revised more than twenty environmental laws and had as-
sumed the dominant role in mitigating environmental harm.52
While the 1970s witnessed the genesis of federal environmental
protection, later decades, and particularly the current one, have seen its
inexorable erosion.53 The Energy Policy Act of 200554 exemplifies this
federal weakening of environment policies. The Act includes billions of
dollars in subsidies for energy industries such as oil and nuclear power;
55
exempts hydraulic fracturing 56 from coverage under the Safe Water
Drinking Act;57 exempts gas and oil construction sites from storm water
runoff regulations under the Clean Water Act;58 authorizes the resump-
tion of drilling along the majority of the U.S. coastline; 59 and strips away
federal energy tax incentives.60 Furthermore, it does nothing to decrease
America's dependence on foreign oil, promote renewable energy re-
source development, or address climate change.6 1
Recently, Professor Parenteau, a long-time environmental litigator,
blasted the Bush Administration for compiling the "worst environmental
record of any administration in history," and asserted that "[f]rom day
one, [it] has set about the task of systematically and unilaterally disman-
tling over thirty years of environmental and natural resources law. 62
Furthermore, he states that the Bush Administration is on a "full-fledged
ideological crusade to deregulate polluters, privatize public resources,
limit public participation, manipulate science, and abdicate federal re-
sponsibility for tackling national and global environmental problems. 63
51. Id. at 737.
52. Id. at 747.
53. Id at 772.
54. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § l(a), 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7, 10, 15-16,
22-23, 25-26, 30, 33, 35, 40, 42-43, 48-49 U.S.C.).
55. 151 CONG. REC. S9335, S9346 (2005).
56. Hydraulic fracturing is a method used to create fractures that extend from a borehole into
rock formations; its main industrial use is in stimulating production from oil and gas wells. Wikipe-
dia, Hydraulic Fracturing, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydraulic-fracturing (last visited Mar. 24,
2008).
57. 151 CONG. REC. S9335, S9346 (2005).
58. Id
59. Id.
60. Id. at S9343.
61. Id. at S9346.
62. Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 14
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 363 (2004).
63. Id
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B. The States Reassert Their Police Power
Dissatisfied with the appalling federal response to environmental
protection, especially with respect to global warming-the most signifi-
cant environmental issue of our time-states have reasserted themselves
by pursuing their own environmental initiatives. 64  Despite the estab-
lished trend of federal control over social and economic policy, states
have become increasingly proactive in reasserting their roles as inde-
pendent policymakers and have been quite innovative in implementing a
broad assortment of policies on economic development, health care, hu-
man welfare, and environmental issues.65 Tax incentives are a common
means of implementing policies. 66 In Washington, legislators have com-
bined environmental and tax policies by promoting renewable energy
investment through the use of tax incentives.
III. A NEW APPROACH-SYNTHESIZING ENVIRONMENTAL
AND TAx POLICIES IN WASHINGTON
In what has been called the most progressive renewable energy leg-
islation ever passed in the country, 67 RCW sections 82.04.440 and
82.16.120 codify the legislature's intent to provide incentives for the
greater use of locally created renewable energy technologies, and to en-
courage businesses in the solar electric energy sector to locate in Wash-
ington. 68 Section 82.16.120 promotes strong market demand for renew-
able energy projects, particularly solar photovoltaic energy,69 by estab-
lishing an "investment cost recovery incentive" for homeowners, busi-
nesses, and local governmental entities that install solar electric systems,
wind turbines, and biomass-powered generators. 70 Additionally, the in-
centive is available if certain components used to produce customer-
generated electricity are manufactured within Washington. 7'
While section 82.16.120 takes care of the demand side of the equa-
tion, section 82.04.440 tackles the supply side by fostering the
64. Vicki Arroyo, Learning from State Action on Climate Change March 2006 Update, SL098
ALI-ABA 101, 103 (2006) ("State governments cite a variety of reasons for action, including pro-
moting economic development, reducing vulnerability to fluctuating energy prices, and preventing
damages to the states' resources from climate change.").
65. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1996).
66. Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 413.
67. Jesse Broehl, Washington State Passes Progressive Renewable Energy Legislation,
RENEWABLEENERGYACCESS.COM, May 10, 2005,
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/story?id=28478.
68. 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 300, § 1; id ch. 301, § 1.
69. Broehl, supra note 67.
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.16.120(1), (5) (2008).
71. § 82.16.120(5)(a)-(c).
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manufacture of renewable energy systems and components.72  Specifi-
cally, this section provides a tax credit to solar energy companies, with
the purpose of encouraging the in-state manufacture and sales of photo-
voltaic and related equipment.
With the enactment of these statutes, Washington State has the po-
tential to become one of the world's most robust regions of economic
growth. 73 In the past, Washington was a national leader in the manufac-
ture of renewable energy equipment, 74 but many manufacturers have
moved to other regions, perhaps due to the state's high sales tax.75
Through the use of these tax incentives, Washington can expect to revi-
76talize its renewable energy manufacturing industry.
More importantly, however, these bills facilitate environmental pro-
tection by promoting the use of renewable energy. While promoting eco-
nomic growth is a state imperative, combating global warming and ozone
degradation is paramount. To this end, the increased use of renewable
energy is critical. The massive danger posed by climate change provides
a compelling reason to encourage such increased use by means of tax
incentives.77
Since the 1980s, every state has used tax incentives to encourage
expansion of local industry.7 8 State policymakers urge that these are in-
dispensable tools for stimulating and maintaining business investment,
job opportunities, and economic growth.79 Incentives such as these have
nonetheless created intense competition between states in attracting busi-
nesses.80 As a result, tax incentives favoring local industry are subject to
being struck down as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.8'
Indeed, many scholars of state and local tax law have posited that state
72. Broehl, supra note 67.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. ENERGY Div., supra note 18, at 24 (noting that "state sales tax poses a major barrier to
doing business in Washington").
76. Id.
77. Wendy B. Davis, Elimination of the Depletion Deduction for Fossil Fuels, 26 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 197, 210 (2002).
78. Veena Iyer, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. Dormant Commerce Clause Limits State Loca-
tion Tax Incentives, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 523, 523 (2005).
79. Id. But see S. Mohsin Resa, Comment, Daimlerchrysler v. Cuno: An Escape from the
Dormant Commerce Clause Quagmire?, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1229, 1231-32 (2006) ("Critics of tax
incentives argue that there are a host of reasons why the pervasive use of such incentives is a fiscally
unsound practice. One complaint is that the current system allows public officials to unfairly pick
and choose which companies and projects will receive millions of dollars in aid .... Perhaps the
most basic criticism of the broad use of tax incentives is that they are not nearly as vital to the crea-
tion ofjobs and growth of business as proponents of tax incentives believe.")
80. Bradford C. Spencer, Evaluating Kentucky's Investment Tax Credits in Light ofCuno v.
DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 94 KY. L.J. 161, 164 (2005).
81. Hellerstein, supra note 30; see infra Parts IV-V.
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tax incentives, like Washington's, represent an unconstitutional exercise
82of state power.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The General Powers of Congress
under the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause expressly empowers Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, 83 as articulated by the Court in Prudential Insur-
ance Co. v. Benjamin:
The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely without
reference to coordinated action of the states is not restricted, except
as the Constitution expressly provides, by any limitation which for-
bids it to discriminate against interstate commerce and in favor of
local trade. Its plenary scope enables Congress not only to promote
but also to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has done frequently
and for a great variety of reasons. That power does not run down a
one-way street or one of narrowly fixed dimensions. Congress may
keep the way open, confine it broadly or closely, or close it entirely,
subject only to the restrictions placed upon its authority by other
constitutional provisions and the requirement that it shall not invade
the domains of action reserved exclusively for the states.
84
Hence, Congress has the ability to establish essentially any policy re-
garding any aspect of interstate commerce,85 which means that it can
control "competition in interstate business-and by virtue of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, take measures designed to work its will regard-
ing that competition, even if those measures regulate local activities. 8 6
By virtue of its Commerce Clause power, Congress can limit the taxing
power of the states by implementing additional restrictions on state tax-
ing authority. 87  Conversely, it can increase the state taxing power by
removing any existing restraints.88
82. Spencer, supra note 80, at 162.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
84. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) (footnotes omitted).
85. DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL 114 (West Publishing
Co. 1987) (1974).
86. Id.
87. Economic Development and the Commerce Clause: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties and the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administra-
tive Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2005) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (state-
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The Commerce Clause power is twofold. It grants power to Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce, but it also limits the states' power
to interfere with such commerce. 89 This negative restriction on state
power is the basis for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.90 Specifi-
cally, the dormant (or negative) Commerce Clause doctrine establishes
that the power to regulate commerce is reserved for Congress, thus pro-
hibiting the states from legislating in that arena even if Congress is silent
on a particular commerce-related issue.91 In the absence of congressional
legislation-when congressional commerce authority is dormant-the
Court is left to determine whether state legislation has nevertheless
impermissibly impinged upon inherent federal commerce authority:
For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine
that the commerce clause, without the aid of congressional legis-
lation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimi-
cal to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where Con-
gress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is
under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing
demands of state and national interests.92
Because Congress has failed to legislate on the subject of the use of
state tax incentives, the Court, in its role as "final arbiter," has concocted
an abstruse jurisprudence that has left state officials baffled as to the con-
stitutional legitimacy of the tax incentives they use to promote economic
growth.
B. The Gloss: How the Supreme Court
Interprets the Dormant Commerce Clause
Unfortunately, few principles of constitutional law are as imprecise
and ill defined as the premise that the dormant Commerce Clause forbids
states from enacting taxes that discriminate against interstate com-
merce.93 The Court itself has openly admitted that its dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence is a "quagmire., 94 While declaring that its
decisions "[do] not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems
to encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and
industry," 95 the Court has invalidated state tax incentives "designed to
89. Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax
Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 881 (1986).
90. ld at 881-82.
91. Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local Gov-
ernments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 233, 237 (1999).
92. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
93. Zelinsky, supra note 33, at 1.
94. Id.
95. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
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achieve that very objective. ' 96 How then is one to distinguish between
those state taxes which discriminate against interstate commerce and
those which do not, when the Court has never clearly set out the scope of
the doctrine that bars discriminatory taxes?
97
C. The History of the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
In the last three decades, the Court has considered four state tax
measures, each of which was designed to generate economic activity
within the state.98 The Court invalidated each measure, but "did so with
rhetoric so sweeping that a literal reading of the Court's opinions cast a
constitutional cloud over a broad array of tax incentives." 99 The follow-
ing Subsections briefly review these cases in an attempt to create a
clearer understanding of the Court's jurisprudence in this area.
1. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,100 the Court
dealt with an amendment to New York's securities transfer tax that was
intended to promote the New York securities industry. 0 1 The plaintiff
argued that the amendment discriminated against interstate commerce
because it "impos[ed] greater tax burden[s] on securities transactions
involving out-of-state sales than on [similar] transactions ... involving
in-state sales.'02 Prior to the amendment, the transfer tax was "neutral
as to in-state and out-of-state sales,"'1 3 because, regardless of the location
of the sale, the tax burden fell evenly on all transactions effectuated by a
New York transfer agent. 0 4 The amendment, the plaintiff alleged, "up-
set this equilibrium" by forcing a seller to consider tax liability when
determining where to conduct business.'0 5
The Court unanimously concluded that the amendment violated the
Commerce Clause; by inducing sellers to deal with in-state instead of
out-of-state brokers, the New York amendment "forclose[d] tax-neutral
decisions. ' 0 6 Furthermore, the Court noted that by "using its power to
96. Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 414.
97. Id. at 415; see also Note, Functional Analysis, Subsidies, and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1537, 1537 (1997).
98. Joint Hearing, supra note 87.
99. Id.
100. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
101. Id. at 326-28 & n.10.
102. Id. at 320.
103. Id. at 330.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 330-31.
106. Id. at 331.
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tax an in-state operation as a means of 'requiring [other] business opera-
tions to be performed in the home State,"' New York had caused busi-
ness activity to be diverted from the most economically efficient chan-
nels, an act wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the Com-
merce Clause. 0 7 In its conclusion, the Court pointed out that its decision
"[did] not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to en-
courage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and indus-
try."'0 8 It failed, however, to provide a means to pursue this end.
2. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,10 9 the Court examined Hawaii's
excise tax exemption on wholesale liquor sales for certain locally pro-
duced alcoholic beverages.' 10 While recognizing that the purpose of the
tax exemptions was to aid Hawaii's industry, and reaffirming that a state
can enact laws under its police power "that have the purpose and effect
of encouraging domestic activity," the Court noted that "the Commerce
Clause stands as a limitation on the means by which a State can constitu-
tionally seek to achieve that goal."' The Court also noted that it was
irrelevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry that Hawaii desired to aid the
makers of locally produced beverages rather than to harm manufacturers
based in other states."' 2 Ultimately, the Court ruled that Hawaii's liquor
tax exemption was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause "be-
cause it had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of lo-
cal products."'1 3 Unfortunately, the Court did nothing more than reaf-
firm its ban on discriminatory taxation; it offered no new insights regard-
ing the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause.
14
3. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully," 5 the Court confronted the
legality of a franchise tax credit provided by New York to certain income
of "Domestic International Sales Corporations," a type of corporate en-
tity given special recognition in the Internal Revenue Code.1 6 Simply
put, the state taxed income attributable to New York exports at 30% of
107. Id. at 336 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970)).
108. Id.
109. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
110. Id. at 265.
111. Id. at 271.
112. Id. at 273.
113. Id.
114. Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 418.
115. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
116. Id. at 390.
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the rate applicable to income attributable to export shipments from other
states.17 The Court held that New York's reduction of tax liability for
New York exporters violated the Commerce Clause both because it
"'create[d] ... an advantage for firms operating in New York by placing
a 'discriminatory burden on commerce to its sister States,"' and because
it foreclosed neutral tax decisions. 
18
4. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach
In a more recent case, New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 19
the Court reviewed a state tax incentive designed to promote ethanol
production in the state. Ohio provided a tax credit against the Ohio mo-
tor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers,
but only if the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state that granted
similar tax advantages to ethanol produced in Ohio.
120
The Court-unsurprisingly-held that the ethanol tax incentive vio-
lated the Commerce Clause, because it "explicitly deprive[d] certain
products of generally available beneficial tax treatment because they
[were] made in certain other States, and thus on its face appear[ed] to
violate the cardinal requirement of nondiscrimination."1 2 1 In response to
the State's argument that it could have accomplished the same result by
using a cash subsidy, the Court maintained that the Commerce Clause,
rather than prohibiting all state actions that grant marketplace advantages
to its residents, only prohibits actions arising under a state's regulation of
interstate commerce.'22
5. Lessons Learned
In sum, state tax incentives that violate the Commerce Clause pro-
hibition against discriminatory taxation typically have two things in
common. First, discriminatory state tax incentives favor in-state over
out-of-state activities. 23 Second, discriminatory state tax incentives, as
vital components of the state's taxing mechanism, implicate the coercive
power of the state.1 24  While states may enact laws that encourage
117. Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 419.
118. Tully, 466 U.S. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,
331 (1977)).
119. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
120. Id. at 270.
121. Id. at 274.
122. Id. at 278 ("Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that
prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.").
123. Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 424.
124. Id.
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domestic industry under the police power,' 25 the Commerce Clause con-
fines the manner in which they can legitimately compete for interstate
trade. 1 26 When a state provides a tax benefit to an in-state taxpayer, but
fails to make the same benefit available to an out-of-state taxpayer, any
decision by a taxpayer to invest in that state is coerced. 27 To put it dif-
ferently, when a rational taxpayer allocates its resources in a method that
maximizes its after-tax profits, it will steer its investments toward the
states which offer such tax benefits.' 28 Consequently, these tax incen-
tives are subject to constitutional challenge on the basis of their discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce through the coercion of resources into
the state on the basis of tax, rather than nontax, criteria.'
29
D. The Court Dodges the Constitutional
Question in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno
The Court's most recent opportunity to clarify its Commerce
Clause jurisprudence arose in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,' 30 a case
in which the constitutionality of state tax incentives was challenged. In
Cuno, the Sixth Circuit, trying to find its footing on the shaky ground of
Commerce Clause case law, had issued an opinion that called into ques-
tion the constitutionality of all state tax incentives. When the Court
granted certiorari, many state and federal actors hoped that it would seize
the opportunity to definitively announce the constitutional status of such
incentives. Unfortunately, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and thus refused to examine the merits of their claim.
1. Sixth Circuit's Decision in Cuno
The Cuno case involved tax abatements and investment tax credits
that were granted to an automobile manufacturer in order to induce it to
build a new plant locally, the Sixth Circuit unanimously held that the tax
credits for the new in-state investment were unconstitutional because
they discriminated against interstate commerce.' 3' The court, however,
did sustain the state's personal property tax exemption for new in-state
investment. 32 It stated that the investment tax credit, while not discrimi-
natory on its face because it was equally available to both in-state and
125. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984).
126. Id. at 272.
127. Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 422.
128. Id. at 423.
129. Id.
130. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
131. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 742-46 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated in part, 547
U.S. 332 (2006).
132. Id. at 746-48.
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out-of-state businesses, was discriminatory nonetheless. 133  The court
reasoned that any business that was already doing business in Ohio
would be able to reduce its existing tax liability by locating new machin-
ery and equipment within the state, while it would not receive the same
benefit if it located a comparable business operation outside the state.
134
The defendants unsuccessfully argued that the Commerce Clause
case law should be interpreted narrowly to reach the result that tax incen-
tives are permissible so long as they do not penalize out-of-state eco-
nomic activity.135 Specifically, the defendants argued that state tax cred-
its and exemptions only violate the Commerce Clause if they either func-
tion like a tariff, by placing a higher tax upon out-of-state businesses or
products, or penalize out-of-state economic activity, by relying on both
the taxpayer's in-state and out-of-state activities to determine the its ef-
fective tax rate. 136 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the
defendants' proposed approach was premised on a "tenuous" distinction
between laws that benefit in-state activity and those that burden out-of-
state activity.
137
The court also rejected the defendants' attempt to analogize the in-
vestment tax credit to a direct subsidy.138 While acknowledging that sub-
sidies do not "ordinarily run afoul" of the Commerce Clause, the court
pointed out that the Supreme Court "has intimated that attempts to create
location incentives through the state's power to tax are to be treated dif-
ferently from direct subsidies despite their similarity in terms of end-
result economic impact."'
' 39
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio's personal property tax
exemption was constitutional.140  The plaintiffs had urged that the ex-
emption was discriminatory because its eligibility conditions required a
recipient to agree to maintain a specific level of employment and invest-
ment in the state, and that effectively, the conditions subjected two simi-
larly situated owners of Ohio personal property to different tax rates.141
The court sided with the defendants on this claim, holding that "ex-
emptions raise no constitutional issues when the conditions for obtaining
the favorable tax treatments are related to the use or location of the
133. Id. at 743.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 745.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 746.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. ("A taxpayer who agrees to focus his employment or investment in Ohio receives ... a
tax break, while a taxpayer who prefers to preserve the freedom to hire or invest elsewhere does
not.").
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property itself."' 142 In other words, "an exemption may be discriminatory
if it requires the beneficiary to engage in another form of business in or-
der to receive the benefit or is limited to businesses with a specified eco-
nomic presence."' 143 The exemption in issue required only an investment
in new or existing property; thus, because the conditions related to the
property itself, they did not burden interstate commerce.' 44 Moreover,
the court noted that the exemption was not discriminatory because the
property tax was levied only on Ohio businesses. 145 Consequently, if a
business were to invest in Ohio, it could limit its personal property tax
liability, but if it were to invest elsewhere, it would not be subject to
Ohio's personal property tax, thus rendering the loss of the tax credit ir-
relevant. 
46
Because of its ominous implications for any and all state tax incen-
tives, many of which are materially indistinguishable from Ohio's, the
Sixth Circuit's decision created quite a stir.147 In addition, it drastically
departed from precedent and further muddied the already murky waters
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 1
48
2. Supreme Court
In granting certiorari, the Court instructed the parties to brief and
argue the question of whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge
Ohio's investment tax credit. 149 A mere eight weeks after hearing oral
argument on this issue, the Court unanimously concluded that the plain-
tiffs had no standing to challenge state tax or spending decisions simply
by virtue of their status as state taxpayers. 150 As a result, it declined to
evaluate the merits of the challenged tax credit, instead remanding the
case for dismissal. 1S Subsequently, the Court declined to review the
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id at 747.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, 9, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332
(2006) (No. 04-1704), available at 2005 WL 1457703; see also Chris Atkins, Cuno v. Daimler-
Chrysler: A Pyrrhic Victory for Economic Neutrality, TAX FoUND., Apr. 18, 2005,
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/344.html ("Not only does Cuno fail to stop the
bidding war between states and localities for business investment, but it also applies to legitimate tax
policies that are naturally, but not unconstitutionally, discriminatory.").
148. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Tax Foundation in Support of Petition for a Writ Certiorari at
2-4, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (No. 04-1704), available at 2005 WL
1687283.
149. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005).
150. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342-46 (2006).
151. Id. at 354.
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Sixth Circuit's ruling that Ohio's personal property tax exemption did
not violate the Commerce Clause.
15 2
Conveniently, or perhaps strategically, the Court was able to tem-
porarily avoid dealing with the ever-looming constitutional quandary of
state tax incentives. Barring any forthcoming congressional legislation
seeking to remedy this legal uncertainty, other plaintiffs are sure to bring
suits presenting similar questions, which the Court would eventually
need to face. The question, then, is whether the current Court is disin-
clined to further muddle its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Could it instead be encouraging-if not obligating-Congress to deter-
mine what constitutes a burden on interstate commerce?
E. Congressional Response to Cuno
Following the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cuno,153 Senator Voino-
vich introduced legislation "clarify[ing] that State tax incentives for in-
vestment in new machinery and equipment are a reasonable regulation of
commerce and not an undue burden on interstate commerce. ' ' 154 Shortly
thereafter, Representative Chandler introduced similar legislation.
15
Both bills were referred to committee, but no further action was taken
before the end of the 108th Congress.
After the 109th Congress convened, Senator Voinovich introduced
the Economic Development Act of 2005.156 Cosponsored by Senator
Frist and at least twelve other senators, the bill authorized "any State to
provide to any person for economic development purposes tax incentives
that otherwise would be the cause or source of discrimination against
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause."' 157  Representative
Tiberi introduced an identical companion bill in the House on the same
day. 158 Although these bills were not enacted, Senator Voinovich's quest
to overrule Cuno continues.
1 59
In sum, the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggests that
any state tax incentive program could potentially be found unconstitu-
tional.160 A challenged tax incentive will not pass constitutional muster
152. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. 1147 (2006).
153. See supra notes 131-48 and accompanying text.
154. S. 2881, 108th Cong. (2004).
155. H.R. 5427, 108th Cong. (2004).
156. Economic Development Act of 2005, S. 1066, 109th Cong. (2005).
157. Id. § 2.
158. Economic Development Act of 2005, H.R. 2471, 109th Cong. (2005).
159. See S. 914, 11 Oth Cong. (2007) ("Congress authoriz[es] any State to provide to any person
for economic development purposes tax incentives that would otherwise be the cause or source of
discrimination against interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.").
160. Enrich, supra note 65, at 432.
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if it discriminates on its face or if, after analyzing the purpose and effect
of the provision, it will discriminate against interstate commerce by pro-
viding a direct benefit to a local business.' 6' Moreover, "[a] state tax
provision that discriminates against interstate commerce is invalid unless
it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served
by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."'162  State tax incentives,
then, are constitutionally suspect and will likely be held invalid if the
state "foreclose[s] tax-neutral decisions" by coercive use of its taxing
authority.
163
V. Do WASHINGTON'S TAX INCENTIVES SURVIVE
COMMERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY?
In light of Cuno, the current extent of state power to utilize tax in-
centives promoting economic growth and renewable energy use is nebu-
lous at best. Thus, the constitutionality of Washington's progressive new
incentives under the Commerce Clause is questionable.
A. RCW sections 82.04.440 and 82.16.120
Section 82.16.120 provides an "investment cost recovery incentive"
for Washington individuals, businesses (except utilities), or local gov-
ernmental entities that generate electricity on their property using a wind
generator, solar energy system, or anaerobic digester.' 64 The law allows
for a fifteen-cent credit (up to $2,000 annually per participant) per kilo-
watt-hour (kWh) of electricity generated by a renewable energy sys-
tem. 65 The credit increases or decreases based on the type of customer-
generated electricity used.166 For example, a credit of thirty-six cents per
kWh is allowed if the customer uses a solar module manufactured in
Washington, and a credit of eighteen cents per kWh is authorized if the
customer uses a solar or a wind generator equipped with an inverter
manufactured in Washington.' 67 A customer using only a wind generator
with blades not manufactured in Washington, however, will recover a
161. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 742-46 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated in part, 547
U.S. 332 (2006).
162. Id. (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
163. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.16.120(1), (5) (2008). Anaerobic digestion is the process by
which microorganisms break down biodegradable material in the absence of oxygen, thereby pro-
ducing a gas suitable for energy production. Wikipedia, Anaerobic Digestion,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anaerobicdigester (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
165. § 82.16.120.
166. § 82.16.120(5); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 458-20-273(8) (2008).
167. § 82.16.120.
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credit of only eight cents per kWh. 168 Because these factors are cumula-
tive, a customer using Washington-made solar modules and inverter
would enjoy a maximum credit of fifty-four cents per kWh.1
69
Section 82.04.440 provides a tax credit for persons manufacturing
or wholesaling certain solar energy systems and components, when such
activity takes place within Washington. 170 Manufacturers are allowed a
credit for (1) gross receipts taxes paid to another state in connection with
sales of products manufactured in Washington; (2) manufacturing taxes
paid with respect to the manufacturing of products using materials ex-
tracted in Washington; and (3) manufacturing taxes paid in connection
with manufacturing activities completed in another state for products
partly manufactured in Washington. 171 Wholesalers receive a credit for
any (1) manufacturing taxes paid with respect to the manufacturing of
products sold in Washington, together with (2) extracting taxes paid in
connection with the extracting of materials of products sold in Washing-
ton. 
172
B. The Constitutionality of RCW Sections 82.04.440 and 82.16.120
Washington's new tax incentives are very similar to the taxing
schemes discussed above, 173 and are thus likely to raise similar Com-
merce Clause concerns.1 74 Applying the Court's jurisprudence to these
statutes, the credit offered by section 82.16.120 arguably deprives certain
products of generally available tax benefits because they are made in
other states; as such, it appears discriminatory for Commerce Clause pur-
poses.1 75 By providing a tax benefit for in-state investment that is not
available to an identical out-of-state investment, a taxpayer's investment
location decision is influenced in favor of the former, 176 thus providing
an explicit advantage to local businesses. 177
Similarly, section 82.04.440's manufacturing and wholesaling tax
credits are subject to attack on the ground that they "offend the 'free
168. Id.
169. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 458-20-273(9) (2008).
170. § 82.04.440(2), (4). Section 82.04.440 works in conjunction with section 82.04.294,
which sets the base tax rate for manufacturers and wholesale sellers of certain solar energy systems




173. See supra Part IV.C-D.
174. Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environ-
mental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 278 (1999).
175. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbauch, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
176. Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 422.
177. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984).
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trade' purposes of the Commerce Clause by inducing resources to be al-
located among the states on the basis of tax rather than nontax crite-
ria. ' 178 The provision of such incentives, it can be argued, will imper-
missibly induce the solar industry to invest in Washington, rather than in
states which do not offer this type of benefit.
One can also argue, of course, that the statutes do not violate the
Commerce Clause. Although the incentives appear to discriminate
against interstate commerce, courts have been willing to recognize a
state's authority to encourage local growth through the use of subsidies,
and certain Justices have stated that tax credits and tax breaks are per-
missible as well.'7 9 Furthermore, some commentators contend that in-
centives which "simply reduce the burden of a state tax on the same
product, investment, or activity that the state seeks to promote are not
constitutionally suspect., 180  Nevertheless, due to the hybrid of goals
Washington seeks to effectuate, this argument is comparatively weak and
would probably not withstand judicial scrutiny.
Even if Washington's tax incentives violate the Commerce Clause
under the traditional analysis, they might nonetheless be upheld under an
alternate method of analysis. Under this view, a tax incentive that ad-
vances a "legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives" can withstand Commerce
Clause scrutiny.
18 1
C. Is Environmental Protection a Local Purpose that Cannot Be
Adequately Served by Reasonable Nondiscriminatory Alternatives?
Although relevant case law is scarce, the Court has, on at least one
occasion, upheld a state statute promoting energy conservation on the
ground that there were no less discriminatory avenues to achieve the
state's goal. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 182 the Minne-
sota Legislature, for the purpose of promoting resource conservation,
easing solid waste disposal problems, and conserving energy, enacted a
statute banning the retail sale of milk in plastic containers, but permitted
such sale in other containers, such as paperboard cartons. 83  The
178. Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 423 (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S.
388,402 (1984)).
179. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co., 426 U.S. 794, 816 (1976) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ("Whether [a state's] encouragement takes the form of a cash subsidy, a tax credit, or a special
privilege intended to attract investment capital, it should note [sic] characterized as a 'burden' on
commerce.").
180. Engel, supra note 174, at 280.
181. SeeNew Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbauch, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
182. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
183. Id. at 459.
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plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated the Commerce Clause because
it imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 84 The Court
rejected this argument, stating that the statute did not constitute "simple
protectionism," but rather "regulate[d] evenhandedly," because it treated
all milk retailers alike without regard to whether the milk, the containers,
or the sellers were from outside the state. 185 Further, the Court held that
the statute was not "clearly excessive," in light of the substantial state
interest in easing solid waste disposal problems and promoting the con-
servation of energy and other natural resources.1
86
Under this line of analysis, Washington would bear the burden of
showing the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to
preserve the local interests at stake. 87 This task is onerous and subject to
rigorous scrutiny.188 Washington would be hard pressed to prove that the
goals of promoting renewable energy could not be served adequately by
other methods. Although the state obviously has a substantial interest in
protecting its constituents from the harmful effects of global warming, its
tax incentives were not implemented solely to combat that problem; leg-
islators also sought to promote economic growth within the state. 89 In
order to withstand rigorous constitutional scrutiny, Washington would
need to show both that the incentives at issue are not "clearly excessive"
and that there are no less discriminatory alternatives available.' 90 Under
a Clover Leaf analysis, given the grave implications of global warming,
as well as the substantial state interest in promoting energy conservation
and renewable energy use, a court would likely conclude that the incen-
tives are not "clearly excessive."' 9' Whether less discriminatory alterna-
tives are available, however, is a harder question. Arguments supporting
an answer in the negative appear unpersuasive when one considers the
dual nature of Washington's tax incentives. Consequently, it is unlikely
that a court would side with the State under a rigorous scrutiny level of
review.
In summary, it is uncertain whether Washington's tax incentives
could withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny. Indeed, the Court's recent
disinclination to address the issue in Cuno has left many states wonder-
ing about the viability of their own respective tax incentives. Nobody
knows what the Court will do next in this area; frankly, it is unlikely the
184. Id. at 470.
185. Id. at 471.
186. Id. at 473.
187. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
188. ENGDAHL, supra note 85, at 284.
189. 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 301, § 1.
190. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,456 (1981).
191. See id. at 473.
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Justices themselves know. Justice Scalia illustrated the extent of the
problem when he recently characterized the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence as "various tests from our wardrobe of ever-changing
negative Commerce Clause fashions."'192 Moreover, the current Justices
have shown less willingness to invoke the Commerce Clause than their
predecessors. Justice Thomas, in particular, has adamantly opposed the
application of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, stating on multi-
ple occasions that it "has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes
little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application."'' 93 As
the Court's admissions make clear, the time has come for Congress to
act. It must utilize its legislative power under the Commerce Clause to
put a stop to the Court's jurisprudential madness.
VI. A COMPELLING CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
A. Periodic Congressional Action Has Been
Ineffective and Noncomprehensive
As stated previously, Congress possesses inherent authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate state taxation of interstate commerce.
One example of congressional intervention may be found in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,194 in which the Court upheld a South Caro-
lina tax on insurance premiums that was imposed solely on foreign com-
panies. The levy would have been invalidated under the Commerce
Clause, but Congress, via the McCarran-Ferguson Act, authorized South
Carolina to implement it.' 95 Unfortunately, Congress has affirmatively
acted in this fashion only on rare occasions, and has never clarified the
troubling issues that surround state tax incentives.
Congress could, of course, continue to do nothing. According to
some academics, the Court is the best arbiter of Commerce Clause dis-
putes. For example, Professor Enrich, a preeminent tax authority, con-
tends that the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides a solid
foundation for constitutional assaults on various forms of business tax
breaks. 96 He takes the position that state tax incentives threaten to
prompt precisely the type of economic balkanization that the dormant
Commerce Clause is meant to prevent, at the expense of the national
192. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
193. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
195. Id.
196. Enrich, supra note 65, at 378.
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welfare. 197 He further argues that the pressures of interstate competition
for economic stability will trigger a race to the bottom. 198 In his view,
the Court need only refocus its jurisprudence, which in turn would end
the detrimental effects of state competition for business and "reassert the
primacy of the Commerce Clause as a protector of a robust national
economy and a healthy federalism."' 99
Yet inaction by Congress would unquestionably have profound ef-
fects. Professor Hellerstein, another prominent tax authority, contends
that if Congress does not act, thereby leaving the validity of state tax in-
centives to the mercy of existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence, judi-
cial uncertainty and inconsistency will continue to undermine the legiti-
macy of state tax incentives. 20 0 He argues that it would take decades for
courts to definitively determine the general validity of the tax incentives
that exist in practically every state.20' Moreover, even if the Court were
to choose to squarely address the question, it is unlikely that this would
lead to a comprehensive resolution of the issue: the Court typically con-
fines its decisions to the facts of individual cases, thereby avoiding ques-
tions closely related to those presented in the case before it.20 2 Touching
upon this very point almost fifty years ago, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
At best, this Court can only act negatively; it can determine
whether a specific state tax is imposed in violation of the Commerce
Clause ....
... Congress alone can provide for a full and thorough canvass-
ing of the multitudinous and intricate factors which compose the
problem of the taxing freedom of the States and the needed limits
203on such state taxing power.
In short, contrary to the beliefs of Professor Enrich, and wholly dis-
tinct from the prudence or efficacy of state tax incentives and the viabil-
ity of various competing readings of the dormant Commerce Clause that
may be advanced, a failure to act by Congress will further perpetuate the
perplexing state of the Court's jurisprudence.20 4
Alternatively, Congress could continue to respond to the Court's
Commerce Clause decisions on a case-by-case basis. But, as stated
197. Id. at 407.
198. Id. at 467.
199. Id.
200. Joint Hearing, supra note 87.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
204. Joint Hearing, supra note 87.
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previously, this would do nothing to address the broader issues of state
tax incentives.
What is truly needed is for Congress to legislate broadly-to create
order in an infamously chaotic area of law. While this task is daunting
and politically challenging, Congress must nevertheless fulfill its duty to
legislate plainly and unambiguously, while retaining the fundamental
features of the Commerce Clause antidiscrimination principle.0 5 Other-
wise, courts will continue to be forced to speculate as to whether a par-
ticular tax incentive discriminates against interstate commerce.
20 6
Whether Congress decides to legislate broadly or narrowly in this arena,
it should, at the very least, authorize states to encourage investment in
renewable energy through tax incentives.
B. Congressional Intervention Is Critical Given
the Grave Danger Posed by Global Warming
Congress should empower the states to combat global warming
through their use of tax incentives. Global warming poses a grave dan-
ger, not only to this nation, but to the international community as well.2 °7
Moreover, climate change is not strictly an environmental problem;
rather it is a "scientific, diplomatic, technological, educational, social,
economic, political, and ethical problem unlike any issue that decision
makers or society previously have tackled. ' '208 States should be permit-
ted to address this complex issue with a wide assortment of interrelated
policies. Indeed, while energy policy, tax policy, and global warming
may seem like unrelated topics at first glance, they are, in fact, inextrica-
bly linked.20 9
Many states, including Washington, have recognized the inextrica-
ble link between energy and tax policy and have begun to combat global
warming by promoting renewable energy. Commentators have noted
that "a properly designed energy-efficiency policy, including a market
incentive to reduce fossil fuel consumption, together with cuts in other
taxes, would be beneficial to a substantial majority of U.S. busi-
nesses." 2 10  Significantly, states like Washington have created a hybrid
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Ferrey, supra note 7.
208. Laura H. Kosloff et al., Outcome-Oriented Leadership: How State and Local Climate
Change Strategies Can Most Effectively Contribute to Global Warming Mitigation, 14 WIDENER L.J.
173, 174 (2004).
209. Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. L. REV.
1135, 1136 (2002).
210. Id. at 1155 (quoting J. Andrew Hoerner & Jan Mutd, Good Business: A Market Analysis of
Energy Efficiency Policy 17 (Ctr. for a Sustainable Econ., Working Paper, 2001)).
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approach that combats climate change while stimulating economic
growth via tax incentives at the same time.
Tax policy offers a viable economic solution to the problem of
global warming.21 1 In fact, the federal tax system has proven successful
in accomplishing social change through the use of economic pressure.
21 2
It seems logical that states can likewise employ tax incentives to achieve
environmental change. Using tax incentives to combat the effects of car-
bon emissions encourages energy conservation, enhances the public wel-
fare, and helps avert the potentially catastrophic effects of global warm-
ing; doing so may even be considered a moral imperative.
213
Shifting our reliance from traditional energy sources to renewable
energy is critical to quelling the threats of global warming; the increased
use of renewable energy will reduce local and regional concentrations of
the harmful greenhouse gases that cause global warming.2 14 In addition,
the renewable energy industry is vitally important to Washington's eco-
nomic health.215 Energy efficiency and renewable energy businesses im-
prove the state's quality of life by utilizing technologies that minimize
the harmful effects of fossil fuels.2 16 Moreover, the renewable energy
industry provides jobs and income to a substantial number of Washing-
ton residents.
21 7
Washington's new tax incentive statutes218 fall squarely within its
police power; Congress should thus allow it and other states to invoke
such authority in order to prevent the catastrophic effects of global
warming. Indeed, Washington's tax incentives, and the tax system in
general, "are an appropriate and effective way in which to encourage
businesses to adopt an environmental ethic and take action to reverse
global warming.',
2 19
C. Original Reasons Justifying the Federal Government's
Dominance of Environmental Regulation Are Invalid
Despite the widespread belief in cooperative federalism, the federal
government essentially dominates environmental regulation.220  The
original reasons for federal intervention in this field, however, are no
211. Id. at 1218.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1216.
214. Engel, supra note 174, at 266.
215. ENERGY Div., supra note 18, at 1.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.04.440(2), (4); 82.16.120.
219. ENERGY Div., supra note 18, at 1.
220. Glicksman, supra note 20, at 740.
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longer valid, 221 if they ever were. As such, Congress must empower the
states to assume the lead role in local environmental regulation.
Advocates of exclusive federal environmental control in the 1970s
offered various reasons why states were not well situated to take a lead
regulatory role.222 They argued that the states lacked scientific expertise
and sufficient resources needed to implement such environmental regula-
tion. 3 Plus, they argued, the federal government initially took the lead
in the development of environmental law and policy, as well as in the
development of expertise and the recruitment of qualified workers,
2 24
The argument in favor of federal dominance of environmental regu-
lation, however, is no longer true. First, the states spend more money
today on environmental issues and employ more environmental officials
than the federal government. 225 States are also more competent than be-
fore, because environmental research is abundant and readily available
226through the Internet. State employees also possess local knowledge
and expertise, which is critical to solving many environmental problems
of a regional nature.
Second, early advocates of federal dominance argued that states
were unable to provide effective constraints on transboundary pollution,
because "[t]he upwind states lack any incentive to cooperate with the
downwind states, and the transactional costs of establishing interstate
regulation are too high for the states." 227 This argument, while perhaps
true with respect to the states' inability to provide effective constraints
on the externalities of pollution, is unpersuasive; the federal government
is likewise unable to effectively constrain transboundary pollution. Also,
while downwind states may have previously lacked incentive to cooper-
ate, the threat of the potentially devastating effects of global warming has
begun to induce states to implement their own policies to combat climate
change.228 Consequently, the problem of interstate regulation costs has
ceased to be of great importance.
221. Id. at 802.
222. Id. at 731-37.
223. Id. at 733-34.
224. Id. at 779.
225. Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Aspects of Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Impli-
cations for Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 573, 628 (1998).
226. Id. at 628-29.
227. Glicksman, supra note 20, at 735 (quoting John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism
Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1220 (1995)).
228. See Paul L. Joffe, The Dwindling Margin for Error: The Realist Perspective on Global
Governance and Global Warming, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89 (2007) (noting the effect of
international law on California's policy of addressing global warming through state legislation and
agreements with European countries).
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Finally, the third justification for federally controlled environmental
regulation was the belief that, absent federal control, "states [were] likely
to compete with one another to attract new business by adopting increas-
ingly lenient controls on activities with potentially damaging environ-
mental effects. ' 229 This "race to the bottom," it is argued, could be effec-
tively overcome only by adopting federal standards that guaranteed "a
minimum level of environmental protection to all Americans, regardless
of their state of residence, and a minimum level of environmental re-
straints for businesses, regardless of where they decide to locate or relo-
cate., 230  Again, this argument, while perhaps a legitimate concern, is
plainly without merit today. Instead of states adopting "increasingly le-
nient controls" on environmentally damaging activities, some states have
actually adopted more stringent controls. 231 Indeed, Congress-not the
states-is guilty of implementing lenient environmental regulations, due
to its rubber stamping of Bush Administration proposals.232
In contrast, granting the states primary authority to regulate local
environmental policy through state tax incentives will likely have far-
reaching benefits. By taking the initiative, innovative states will pave the
way for other states, or even the federal government, to adopt similar
policies.233 To be sure, states often function as "policy laboratories" with
the purpose of developing initiatives that serve as models for federal ac-
tion. 34 This is especially true with environmental regulation, and con-
siderable precedent exists for enacting federal environmental laws based
on previous state innovations.235 State action can thus serve as a catalyst
for both state and federal governments to enact similar environmental
policy, which in turn will decrease the potential devastation threatened
by climate change.
D. The Democratic Takeover of Congress Improves the
Likelihood of New Environmental Legislation
After the 1994 national election sweep by the Republicans, the
104th Congress began to fundamentally challenge previous congres-
sional approaches toward environmental law.236 With the "new right"
229. Glicksman, supra note 20, at 736.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Parenteau, supra note 62, at 364.
233. Kosloff et al., supra note 208, at 181.
234. Arroyo, supra note 64, at 103.
235. See id; see also Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and Climate Change Policy:
American State and Canadian Provincial Policy Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121, 152 (2004).
236. Thomas D. Peterson, The Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in the United States:
Lessons Learned and New Directions, 14 WIDENER L.J. 81, 82-83 (2004).
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Republican leadership in both houses for the first time in forty years,
amendments to environmental legislation were proposed, causing a sig-
nificant shift in federal environmental policy. 237 This conservative ma-
jority justified policy changes on the premise that environmental regula-
tion had damaged the competitiveness of the economy, injured individual
companies and industries, and was not cost effective. 238 Due to the Re-
publican-controlled Congress, the Bush Administration was able to stifle
any open debate on the future of environmental policy and was "able to
make sweeping environmental changes.
239
But times have changed. In 2006, the era of Republican dominance
ended as the Democrats took control of both the House and the Senate
for the first time in twelve years. 240 Because the newly formed Democ-
ratic majority is generally associated with a heightened environmental
sensibility, there is now a strong counterbalance to President Bush on
many critical issues, including environmental ones.241
Many believe that this political shift, along with an increase in the
number of environmentally savvy governors and state legislators, will
lead to environmental policy changes that will help reduce global warm-
ing.242 Already, the new Congress has announced plans to increase fund-
243ing for renewable energy research and production. Additionally, Con-
gress is expected to lessen America's reliance on oil, terminate the large
tax breaks that are currently in place for large oil companies, grant new
incentives for energy-efficient materials, hold the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency accountable for stricter regulations and oversight, promote
"green" businesses, and reduce the threat of drilling in the Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge.244 Recently, the House voted for an $18 billion
tax package that would eradicate tax breaks for five of the largest oil
companies and use the savings to boost incentives for wind energy, solar
energy, and general energy efficiency.245
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Parenteau, supra note 62, at 364.
240. Larry West, Election 2006: Top 10 Potential Environmental Benefits of the 2006 Election,
ABOUT.COM, http://environment.about.con/od/environmentallawpolicy/a/2006_election.htm (last
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VII. CONCLUSION
Global warming poses one of the gravest threats that mankind has
ever faced. Because the federal government has been unable or unwill-
ing to act in response to this crisis, Congress must instead authorize the
states to use their police power in order to enact legislation to protect
their constituents from the deleterious environmental, economic, and
health effects of climate change. Washington's novel synthesis of tax
and environmental policy, exemplified by RCW sections 82.04.440 and
82.16.120, is a compelling approach to combating the looming dangers
presented by the state's carbon emissions. Of course, climate change is a
global problem that demands global action, including federal action in
the U.S. State action has been quite innovative in creating viable solu-
tions to combat climate change, but without federal support, state efforts
may be in vain. Congress must act. Should it fail to do so, our state eco-
system, and those around the globe, will inevitably face an unprece-
dented catastrophic deterioration.
